“In a world dominated by U.S.–China rivalry, Europe must embrace strategic autonomy—or face irrelevance,” warns Philippe Le Corre

The post-globalization era is defined by the U.S.–China confrontation. It is no longer limited to trade but extends to technology, defence, ideology, and global influence. For Europe and Africa, the challenge is clear: remain dependent on great powers or build a third way. On 11 September, the ESSEC Institute for Geopolitics & Business hosts the debate “Welcome to Post-Globalization: Can Europe and Africa Invent a Third Way Between Washington and Beijing?”. Philippe Le Corre, Professor of Geopolitics and Asian Studies at ESSEC Business School, argues that Europe must act decisively—strengthening its strategic autonomy, investing in critical technologies, and forging new alliances—if it wants to stay relevant in tomorrow’s global balance.

The post-globalization era has been defined by the intensification of U.S.–China rivalry. From your perspective, how has this rivalry reshaped the global order, and what does it mean for Europe’s ability to position itself independently?

Philippe Le Corre - Unlike the U.S.-USSR cold war of the 20th century, the U.S.-China competition is taking place now everywhere in every sector. This includes semi-conductors, green technologies, defence, space, AI, biotechnologies, hard sciences, education, diplomacy, culture even. Perhaps the biggest rivalry of all is happening ideologically around the world, especially in the global south. Both the United States and China now call each “strategic competitors”. This in turn has had dramatic consequences for the global order. Multilateralism lies in tatters. As for the EU, its values are being shaken at the core by two powers who do not adhere to what was once known as the “Rules-based international order”.

The EU–China summit in July illustrated both cooperation and confrontation. How do you interpret Beijing’s approach toward Europe today—particularly in trade and investment—and what does this reveal about China’s broader foreign policy?

P.L-C. - There is no love lost between the EU and China. European Commission president Ursula von der Leyden declared sharply on July 24 that an “inflexion point” has been reached: “rebalancing EU-China relations is essential”. With a trade deficit reaching €305 billion in 2024 in China’s favour, one wonders if Beijing really wants to address Brussels’ anxieties around overcapacity, economic security and unfair competition. The EU-China summit was certainly not a success besides the usual statement on climate cooperation. China is, for now, focusing on its bilateral relationship with the U.S. – with a likely Xi-Trump meeting later this year. For all its divisions, the EU still remains a top trading partner to China. As a diplomatic player, it can still manoeuvre between Washington and Beijing as shown in recent decisions vis a vis Russia and Iran. In the multipolar environment advocated by Beijing, proponents of European strategic autonomy can occupy a space for negotiation and action.

Beyond Europe, China is pursuing a more assertive presence in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. How does this expansion challenge the EU’s interests, and what room does Europe have to craft its own “third way” between Washington and Beijing??

P.L-C. - There is no question China wants to be a global player. From the 19th CCP congress onwards, Xi Jinping has stated it countless times. On every continent, it has been challenging the West, acquiring both natural resources and market shares. Its “Belt and Road Initiative”, strangely overlooked in Europe at first, is now seen as a global strategy aiming at increasing Chinese influence around the world. Africa is a case in point, so are Central Asia, Southeast Asia and parts of Latin America. The EU would be well-inspired to put its house in order. It has rightly started being creative by investing in its “Global Gateway” and more ambitious geoeconomic policies.

The question of Taiwan is central to China’s geopolitical agenda. How should European companies assess the risks of escalation in the Taiwan Strait, and what would be the likely economic consequences for Europe if a crisis were to unfold??

P.L-C. - The impact of a war in Taiwan Strait could be huge. Bloomberg Economics has estimated that a conflict between China and Taiwan could trigger a $10 trillion shock to the global economy - around 10% of the world's gross domestic product. Europe would be badly hit. Taiwan is the EU’s fourteenth-largest trading partner and Taiwan's largest foreign investor. There are 12.000 EU passport holders on the island, probably many more if you include all Europeans. EU countries may not have a strong military presence in the region, but they carry economic weight. And they need to prepare for the worst.

India is emerging as both a counterbalance to China and a leader of the Global South. How do you see Europe’s relationship with India evolving, and can it help the EU diversify its partnerships in a post-globalization context??

P.L-C. - Given Beijing's authoritarianism over the past years and its economic nationalism, the European business community is questioning its position and looking to India as an alternative partner. India's robust growth (6.6% in 2025), and rising demographics—have attracted European companies. The EU is already India's largest trading partner, accounting for 12.2% of India's total trade. Ursula von der Leyen also visited India in February with all the European Commissioners, sending a clear message to the authorities. There have been numerous overtures, even though India remains highly protectionist. While EU-China relations face significant challenges, India could emerge as a viable Asian alternative, while China has become, in Brussels' words, "less open to the world and more repressive domestically."

Transatlantic relations remain vital, but the U.S. increasingly pressures Europe—whether on defence spending or trade, as seen with the Turnberry Agreement. Do you believe Europe can negotiate a more equal footing with Washington while also pursuing its own interests in Asia??

P.L-C. - Following France, Germany and The Netherlands, the EU has launched its own Indo-Pacific strategy in 2021. With the world economy pivoting towards Asia, it is essential for Europe to expand its presence and knowledge of this diversified and complex region. ASEAN is an obvious partner to the EU, but the bloc should indeed consolidate his relations with Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand, among others. Most of these countries share many of Europe’ concerns and are willing to engage with us.

As the UN marks its 80th anniversary, debates around the “Global South” opposing the “collective West” are gaining momentum, notably pushed by China and Russia and echoed by India, Brazil, and South Africa in the G20 and BRICS. What role can the EU realistically play within this shifting multilateral landscape??

P.L-C. - This debate started seventy years ago at the Bandung non-aligned movement conference, leading to other concepts such as the “third world”, “emerging countries”, “developing countries” and now the BRICS, a term coined in 2001 by economist Jim O’Neill. They are now ten BRICS countries with little in common. Unless their common goal would be to rally against the United States and their allies? Considering the discrepancies between them, it is doubtful that BRICS will provide an alternative to the UN but, eventually, they will push for a different international order. Europeans ought to be prepared.

Looking ahead to 2035, what role do you foresee for Europe in Asia’s economic and geopolitical landscape, and what should European CEOs already be doing to prepare for that future??

P.L-C. - The European Union is a respected player, the world’s biggest integrated consumer market with its own common currency, and democratic institutions. European brands, technologies and companies are well recognized, and the EU is also the largest aid provider. But the world is changing fast, and Europeans need to become leaders in today’s critical technologies such as AI, chips, fintech, electric vehicles, Bio-breeding. Maintaining European values, standards and the rule of law while investing in the world’s future should be our main aims. As Mario Draghi stated in his 2024 report, it is time to act.

ABOUT THE ESSEC INSTITUTE FOR GEOPOLITICS & BUSINESS

The ESSEC Institute for Geopolitics & Business was created in 2024 to help companies and leaders navigate a world of geopolitical disruption, economic fragmentation, and strategic uncertainty.

We examine how global power shifts transform business models, how firms are becoming geopolitical actors, and how corporate strategies must adapt to the end of business as usual.l.

Rooted in ESSEC’s academic excellence in Cergy-Paris, Rabat and Singapore, the Institute draws on 4 flagship centers::

• the IRENE Center for Negotiation & Mediation,
• the Center for Geopolitics, Defense & Leadership,
• the Center for European Law & Economics, and
• the Chair Business & Industry in Africa.

Together, they bridge cutting-edge research, executive education, and strategic foresight.

Our ambition: to empower geopolitics-proof leaders and build resilient, vigilant organizations in the post-globalisation.

Contact: Thomas FRIANG, Executive Director of the ESSEC Institute for Geopolitics & Business - friang@essec.eduu