As part of the Singapore Strategic Seminar hosted by the ESSEC Institute for Geopolitics & Business on June 26th, we spoke with Dr. Joel NG, Head of the Centre for Multilateralism Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. A leading expert on the global order, regional security, and ASEAN’s role in international cooperation, Dr. NG offers his insights on the erosion of multilateralism, the rise of economic statecraft, and how middle powers in Asia can navigate today’s fractured geopolitical landscape.
As geopolitical rivalries deepen and institutional fragmentation grows, many wonder whether the multilateral system is still fit for purpose. From your perspective, what are the most urgent tensions affecting the legitimacy and functionality of the current international order?
Joel NG - With the US retreat from maintaining its liberal order, one could say the world’s policeman is on a break. The temptation is for other countries to use the lack of an enforcer to settle some scores or seize some advantages – moving international relations in the direction of a power-based order. But this is opposed by states who want to preserve a rules-based order.
The second question is one we thought we left behind at the end of the Cold War: The relationship between states and firms. China’s state-led model is a serious competitor to the “free market” conventional wisdom and increasingly, economic statecraft and industrial policy are being used to exert competitive advantages against rivals. Where this leaves the balance of influence between states and firms is an open question for the future of order.
ASEAN has long championed a “centrality” model of diplomacy. In today’s more polarized and transactional global landscape, can ASEAN still act as a credible convener and bridge-builder between great powers? What are the limits of its influence in this shifting order?
Joel NG - ASEAN’s main role has never been to address the tensions between the great powers. It was formed to address the tensions amongst its own members. Yet the frequency in which this question is raised suggests that its diplomatic practices offer useful lessons and they might address the issues if they behaved a bit more like ASEAN states in thrashing out issues through constant dialogue. ASEAN has limited influence but it is clearly ready to offer platforms and mechanisms if – and only if – the great powers themselves are keen to use them. However, it can’t affect their desire to come to the table per se.
We are seeing increasing overlap between economic statecraft, defense alliances, and digital regulation. How is this convergence of security, trade, and technology governance reshaping the rules of global cooperation — and where does this leave middle powers and regional organisations like ASEAN?
Joel NG - In the past there was an argument that states don’t really choose their alignments: it is the micro-level choices of firms and private actors in economic activities, making daily decisions of where to procure or invest, that aggregate into statistics on how trade leans more towards one country or another, that set the ‘choice’ for states. But once you recognise that logic, it means that if you want to tip the hand of the state in question, you can leverage economic statecraft to force the firms to choose in favour of your state, and then drag the foreign policy of the other state into your camp, or risk jeopardizing the economic interests of their businesses.
This is now an active policy of both the US and China, as they place firm-level restrictions in various economic activities. What middle powers and ASEAN must do is to double down on the regional trade and economic agreements, strengthen the rules-based frameworks and broaden their markets. While this will not be sufficient on its own, it’s very important for domestic economic resilience and to buy time for domestic restructuring or recalibration.
Multilateralism has come under pressure not only from rising powers but also from within the traditional liberal order itself. How do you interpret recent trends in U.S. and European strategic behavior — are they retreating from multilateralism, or trying to reshape it in new terms?
Joel NG - The US retreat from multilateralism will go beyond Trump’s term. He has imposed such hefty cuts that a polarized US congress will never be able to restore. Europe on the other hand is trying to strengthen multilateralism, but the scale of its challenge in its own neighbourhood – particularly Russia and the Middle East – mean that the rest of the world cannot rely on them either.
My reading therefore is that the US will reshape multilateralism by the force of its funding cuts, but not necessarily in a bad way. Bureaucracies are typically forced into their most creative under budget famines, and the UN and other international organizations are clearly going to have to do this. It will be painful in the short run, but if a more sustainable structure develops with less dependence on the West, we might also see a more equitable international order, which is what the ‘Global South’ has been calling for.
Given your research on ASEAN and its Dialogue Partners, what role can Asia-Pacific institutions play in reinforcing rules-based cooperation amid competing visions of global order? Are there new formats or coalitions emerging that could complement or even substitute traditional global institutions?
Joel NG - ASEAN has made clear its preferences for a stable and predictable environment with equal protection before the law. It just released its ASEAN Community Vision 2045 which outlined its long term goals. Strikingly, for the ASEAN Political-Security Community, rules and principles are underlined in virtually all its strategic goals and measures. Translating this to tangible policy, it has recently upgraded the ASEAN Trade In Goods Agreement (ATIGA) and several other economic arrangements. It should be working hard to upgrade the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) which it has signed together with China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand.
Thus Southeast Asia’s frameworks have been strengthened by the newfound political will to cooperate. I don’t see, however, much potential for addressing the challenge with the US multilaterally, as President Trump has no interest in it. The countries will have to do whatever they must bilaterally with the US, but they can still coordinate to ensure they don’t undermine the region in their efforts to seek deals with Washington.
Looking ahead, what should leaders — in both government and business — focus on to strengthen resilience in this era of systemic uncertainty? How can they engage with multilateral frameworks without becoming paralyzed by geopolitical gridlock?
Joel NG - Multilateralism needs to be more flexible. States cannot solve complex challenges unilaterally or even bilaterally. We have seen the rise of ‘minilateralism’ which is a middle ground between bilateralism and multilateralism: Involving a smaller number of states and focused around specific problems, it demonstrates both the frustration with multilateralism but also the limitations of acting alone – it just isn’t possible. But these smaller formats need to be open and inclusive to allow for everyone who wants to play a constructive role to participate.
For businesses, they will need to lean closer to their governments and recognise that the role that governments play in creating rules isn’t just a one-dimensional imposition of limitations on private actors. In fact, the rules generate the predictable environment they need for long-term planning. They also need to think about markets – market size used to be the fundamental consideration, but states who realise this have been using it for leverage increasingly. In exploring new markets, businesses need to think about those states’ commitment to stable business environments and this is usually indicated by the strength of domestic rule of law institutions rather than market size.
ABOUT DR. JOEL NG
Head of the Centre for Multilateralism Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of Singapore, Nanyang Technological University, Dr. Joel NG researches the multilateral trading system, security architectures, and regional/global order, particularly through the lens of ASEAN and its Dialogue Partners.
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The ESSEC Institute for Geopolitics & Business was created in 2024 to help companies and leaders navigate a world of geopolitical disruption, economic fragmentation, and strategic uncertainty.
We examine how global power shifts transform business models, how firms are becoming geopolitical actors, and how corporate strategies must adapt to the end of business as usual.
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